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Abstract 
The aim of this study is to investigate the effect of social factors (expressed as social 
norms, institutional and social trust and social networks) on the decision of individuals to 
pay for the protection of biodiversity. For this purpose an empirical study was carried out 
in two National Parks of Northern Greece. Three scenarios were proposed differing on 
the payment mechanism and the management actors (regulatory, market-based and 
community-based scenarios). Our empirical results show that social capital variables, 
especially social norms and social trust, have a strong influence both on the decision of 
individuals to pay and the specific amount stated. Specifically, we find that social norms 
have a positive influence for the willingness to pay (WTP) of individuals of a state-tax 
and an entrance fee (regulatory and market-based scenario respectively). Furthermore, 
social trust has a positive impact for the WTP through an entrance fee and a community 
tax (market-based and community-based scenario respectively). We also find a higher 
WTP of individuals towards the market based scenario where participation of citizens is 
higher compared to the current management status. Concerning the impact of 
demographic factors, we find that income does not influence the specific amount stated 
by individuals.  
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1. Introduction  
Creating efficient policies for the protection of areas with high biodiversity value is a 
challenging task. An important difficulty while planning management plans for Protected 
Areas (PAs) is the collection of funds in order to assist in their implementation. In this 
context, economic valuation studies may significantly assist. Specifically, several studies 
estimate the value of biodiversity and the Willingness to Pay (WTP) of citizens for the 
protection of areas with high biodiversity value (Adams et al. 2008; Angulo-Valdes and 
Hatcher 2010; Jones et al., 2011; Thur 2010; Bernard et al., 2009; Amigues et al., 2002; 
Turpie, 2003). The information collected from these studies contributes in planning 
procedures and the identification of optimum payment mechanisms. 
The most commonly applied technique for the estimation of WTP is the Contingent 
Valuation Method (CVM) (Mitchell & Carson, 1989). CVM refers to the distribution of a 
questionnaire where a hypothetical scenario and a hypothetical payment vehicle are 
presented to respondents (Hanely & Spash, 1993; Blamey, 1998; Garrod & Willis, 1999). 
Through the hypothetical scenario, respondents are asked to state whether they would be 
willing to pay some amount for the protection of a natural resource and also to specify 
this amount. Despite the wide implementation of the method several biases may occur 
connected either with the planning of the survey or the implementation process 
(Venkatachalam, 2004). One of the most important problem is the high level of refusals 
to pay (zero bidders) (Amigues et al., 2002; Jones et al., 2008; Oglethorpe & Miliadou, 
2000; Damigos & Kaliampakos, 2003; Kontogianni et al., 2003; Birol et al., 2006; 
Pavlikakis & Tsihrintzis, 2005). A high percentage of these refusals are not regarded as 
true zeroes but they represent a protest of the respondent towards some part of the 
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hypothetical scenario (protest responses) (Jones et al., 2008; Meyerhoff & Liebe, 2005; 
Morrison et al., 2000). In order to distinguish protest responses from true zeroes adding 
debriefing questions has been proposed referring to the justification of the refusal from 
the individual (Meyerhoff & Liebe, 2007). However, this technique does not resolve the 
initial motive causing unwillingness to pay. 
According to economic valuation studies, several factors may influence the decision 
of individuals to contribute money for the protection of natural resources and the 
occurrence of protest responses. The most commonly mentioned are environmental 
behavior and awareness (Martin-Lopez et al. 2007), demographic variables (Baral et al. 
2008; Adams et al. 2008) and the type of local use of natural resources (Asafu-Adjaye 
and Tapsuwan 2008). Furthermore, the role of additional factors has been underlined 
(Polyzou et al., 2011; Jones et al., 2011; Krystallis & Chryssohoidis, 2005; Johnston et 
al., 1999) referring to cognitive and structural elements constituting social capital of a 
community (Polyzou et al., 2011; Jones et al., 2008). The most indicative elements of 
social capital are social trust, institutional trust, social norms and social networks 
(Putnam, 2000; Coleman, 1990). Each of these elements may significantly influence the 
tendency of individuals to contribute an amount for the protection of biodiversity. 
However, depending on the policy proposed, it is expected that different factors of social 
capital may also have a different influence on citizens’ perceptions (Jones et al., 2009). 
The aim of the present study is to investigate the influence of social factors on the 
decision of individuals to contribute an amount for the protection of biodiversity and the 
specific amount stated. For this purpose an empirical study was conducted in two 
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National Parks (NPs) of Northern Greece. Specifically, the following issues were 
investigated:  
a. citizens’ willingness to contribute an amount for 3 alternative management 
scenarios for the NPs,  
b. whether there are differences on citizens’ perceptions depending on the 
management scenario proposed and  
c. factors influencing the decision of individuals to pay and their monetary valuation. 
In order to explore the above issues we first employ a Probit model followed by a Tobit 
and then we apply the Heckman sample selection and the two hurdle models assuming 
that the WTP and its intensity are two distinct decisions. Various different sets of factors 
affect the decisions at each level and they are explored analytically in our paper.  Our 
findings show which factors affect the probability of participating and being willing to 
pay for the protection of the environmental areas under consideration. 
The structure of the paper is the following. The next section comments on the effect 
of social capital on WTP reviewing the relative literature while section 3 discusses the 
sample framework, the data used and the proposed econometric methodologies. Section 4 
presents the extracted empirical results. The last section comments on these results and 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. The influence of social capital on WTP 
Social trust refers to trust in other people, either in general (generalized trust) or in 
specific social groups (particularized trust) (Uslaner & Conley, 2003). It is regarded that 
communities where higher levels of social trust exist will also be more willing to act in a 
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collective manner for the protection of natural resources (Pretty, 2003). In the case of 
WTP, it is expected that citizens who tend to trust their fellow citizens will also be more 
positive in contributing some amount for the protection of the environment due to their 
belief that their fellow citizens will act in a similar manner (Polyzou et al., 2011; Jones et 
al., 2011; Wiser, 2007).  
Furthermore, social norms refer to formal or informal rules assisting in the protection 
of the common benefit (Coleman, 1990). The tendency to comply with social norms is 
also expected to influence citizens’ perceptions in a similar manner as social trust. In 
particular, in communities where citizens regard that their fellow citizens will comply 
with social norms they will be more willing to assist in the protection of the environment 
(Pretty, 2003) and thus will be more easily contributing an amount for its protection.   
Regarding institutional trust, this is highly connected with the tendency of individuals 
to contribute some amount for the protection of natural resources. Specifically, trust in 
institutions is closely linked with the perceived level of effectiveness of proposed policies 
(Kim, 2005; Jones et al., 2009; Beierle and Cayford 2002). As a consequence, individuals 
who tend to trust institutions responsible for the management of PAs will also have a 
more positive stance concerning the effectiveness of a proposed policy and are also 
expected to be more positive in contributing an amount (Krystallis & Chryssohoidis, 
2005; Johnston et al., 1999). These assumptions are also connected with the occurrence 
of protest responses. A high level of unwillingness to pay is attributed to the belief that a 
proposed scenario will be ineffective due to the involvement of certain actors (Jones et 
al., 2008; Meyerhoff & Liebe, 2006; Jones et al., 2008; Yoo, 2000; Whitehead & Cherry, 
2007). Finally, social networks refer to formal and informal connections developed in a 
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community (Putnam, 2000). Higher density of social networks is usually accompanied 
with a higher level of environmental awareness for environmental issues and also with 
higher levels of environmental activation (Jones, 2010; Wakefield et al. 2006). 
Consequently, it is expected that citizens who are more informed of environmental issues 
and are more active will be more positive in contributing an amount for the protection of 
biodiversity. 
 
3. Survey, data and proposed econometric methods 
3.1. Description of research areas 
The two National Parks (NPs) selected were the Evros Delta National Park (Evros 
Delta) established in 2007, situated in the eastern border of Greece and the National Park 
of Axios-Loudias-Aliakmonas Delta (ALA Delta) which was established in 2009 and is 
situated near Thessaloniki, the second largest city of Greece. The specific sites were 
selected due to their high biodiversity value (Troumbis and Dimitrakopoulos, 1998). 
Furthermore, although monetary valuations have been implemented in other Parks of 
Northern Greece (Jones et al., 2011; Pavlikakis & Tsihrintzis, 2006; Oglethorpe & 
Miliadou, 2000; Machairas & Hovardas, 2005) no economic valuation studies have been 
conducted so far in the specific areas. 
Regarding the management framework of NPs in Greece, an attempt has been 
conducted in recent years to establish more participatory management frameworks 
(Papageorgiou and Vogiatzakis 2006). However, the role of the state remains very strong 
and the level of participation of local communities in decision-making processes is very 
low (Dimitrakopoulos et al., 2010). In this context, management boards have been 
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created in the two NPs, where the survey was conducted, consisting of representatives 
from different stakeholders (government, local authorities, local community, NGOs) 
responsible for environmental planning and management. The state is responsible for the 
creation of new regulations for the protection of the NPs and the enforcement of these 
regulations. 
3.2. Description of the questionnaire 
In order to investigate the main aims of the study a questionnaire was created, as part 
of a larger survey conducted in the research areas. The questions may be divided in two 
main parts: Firstly, citizens’ perceptions on three management scenarios and their 
willingness to pay, and secondly, factors which may influence their decision to pay, such 
as the level of environmental awareness of citizens and local social capital. Demographic 
data were also collected through the questionnaire.  
3.2.1. Management scenarios and WTP questions 
Three management scenarios were presented to respondents. Each scenario included 
different payment mechanisms and different management actors. Specifically, in the first 
scenario (state-based) the state was responsible both for the financial and environmental 
management of the areas: 
Imagine that a new management framework is established in the area. An entrance in the 
park is permitted only in designated areas and the current legal framework concerning 
the activities that can take place in the park remains. Environmental management of the 
area is solely the responsibility of the state and the Ministry of Environment. Funds for 
the management of the area will be provided from state taxes. Control for illegal 
activities is the responsibility of the state (Ministry of Environment) and the police. 
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The second scenario (market-based) proposed the application of entrance fees in 
the areas:  
‘Imagine that entrance in the park is permitted only with a ticket. Visitors pay a daily fee 
while permanent residents of the area pay a monthly fee (of reduced value compared to 
visitors’ daily fee). The current legal framework concerning the restrictions of activities 
remains. The management of the area is the responsibility of the local authorities. Every 
3 months a council takes place in which citizens may express their opinion for the 
improvement of the management of the area. Revenue from the entrance fees will be used 
for environmental protection of the area and financial management will be conducted 
from the local authorities. Control mechanisms and penalties are also the responsibility 
of local authorities’. 
The third scenario (community-based) promoted the higher involvement of the 
local communities in decision-making and management processes: 
 ‘Suppose that entrance in the park is permitted only in permanent residents of the 
surrounding area while visitors will have to pay an entrance fee. Current legislation 
concerning the activities permitted in the national park remains. Management of the park 
is the responsibility of a new management board consisting of elected representatives 
from the local community (citizens), NGOs, local authorities and the Ministry of 
Environment. Funds for the protection of the park will be managed by the new 
management board and will derive from visitors’ fee and a monthly community tax paid 
from the local community to the management board. Control mechanisms for illegal 
behavior and imposing of penalties will also be the responsibility of the new management 
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board. The new management board will conduct monthly meetings in order to decide on 
the environmental and financial issues of the park’. 
Respondents were asked to declare the level of restriction they perceived on their 
everyday activities from the proposed scenarios (measured on 10 point Likert scale, with 
higher ratings indicating higher restrictions). Furthermore, social and environmental 
benefits were investigated for each proposed scenario (measured on a 10 point Likert 
scale, with higher values representing higher perceived benefits).  
In addition, different WTP questions were presented depending on the 
management scenario presented. Specifically, in the state-based scenario, respondents 
were asked to state if they would be willing to pay a monthly state tax for the protection 
of the NP and to specify this amount. In the market-based scenario citizens were asked if 
they would be willing to pay a monthly ticket of entrance in the NP and to specify this 
amount. In the third scenario citizens were asked to state if they would be willing to pay a 
monthly community tax paid at the new management board and indicate a specific 
amount. 
2.3.2. Factors influencing WTP 
A number of questions were introduced in the models in order to investigate their 
influence on the tendency of individuals to pay for the protection of the NPs. These 
questions may be divided in three main categories:  
a. questions concerning environmental concern of citizens and their level of 
awareness for the NP  
b. questions concerning social capital issues and c. demographic data. 
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Environmental concern and awareness 
A first question was general and concerned the level of interest for environmental 
issues of the respondents (10 point Likert scale, higher values representing higher 
concern). A second set of questions asked respondents 'How important do you regard the 
protection of the specific area' and 'How important do you regard the NP for your 
community’ (10 point Likert scale, higher values revealing higher importance). 
Furthermore, respondents were asked to state if they are aware of the current legal 
protection framework and if they have participated in some kind of voluntary activity for 
the protection of the NP (dichotomous format questions). 
Social issues 
A set of questions were introduced in the questionnaire concerning social capital. 
They can be divided in four main parts:  
a. Social trust measured through 3 questions “Most people can be trusted or you 
can’t be too careful’, ‘Most people are fair or try to take advantage of you’, and 
‘how much do you trust your local community’ (Beugelsdijk and van Schaik, 
2005; Newton and Norris, 2000). All questions were measured on a 10 point 
Likert scale with higher values representing higher levels of trust.  
b. Institutional trust was measured for 4 actors (van Oorschot et al., 2006) which are 
connected with the management of NPs in Greece: the government, the national 
Ministry of Environment, local authorities and the current Management Board of 
each NP. Similarly, to social trust, these questions were measured on a 10 point 
Likert scale with lower valuations representing lower levels of trust.  
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c. Social networks were measured through two questions which are the most 
commonly used in the social capital literature (Newton & Norris, 2000; van 
Oorschot et al., 2006): ‘Have you been a member of NGOs in the past 12 
months’, ‘Have you contributed through voluntary work in an NGOs in the past 
12 months’.  
d. Finally, the tendency to comply with social norms was also investigated through 4 
questions. Specifically, respondents were asked to state how justifiable they 
regard the following actions: ‘tax evasion’, ‘bribing of civil servants’, ‘illegal 
disposal of construction waste’, ‘illegal constructions’. The former two questions 
refer to general social norms while the latter refer to specific environmental 
behaviors which reveal the tendency to comply with environmental social norms 
(Jones et al., 2011). 
Demographic data  
In the final part of the questionnaire demographic data were collected. These referred to 
income level (divided in categories), gender (male/female), educational level (divided in 
categories) and age (year of birth). 
 
3.3. Sample  
The questionnaire was distributed to local communities in the two research areas. The 
survey was conducted during Summer and Autumn of 2010. For each research area, local 
communities affected by the NP were identified and the number of respondents needed 
for a representative sample from each community was determined. The final sample 
frame size was estimated including only individuals between 18-80 years of age 
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(Sampling frame Evros: 8,133, Axios: 32,000).  Due to the lack of lists of the local 
population, experienced researchers approached every fifth occupied house in the 
communities so as to cover as far possible all parts of the communities. Questionnaires 
were administered through face-to-face interviews. In total, 501 questionnaires were 
completed (240 questionnaires from the Evros study area, 261 from Axios; response rates 
were approximately 80% and 60% respectively). 
The sample characteristics are presented in Table 1. The relatively equal 
representation reflects the distribution of the larger Prefectural population according to 
the 2001 census, where the communities are situated (Axios: Male 50.63%, Female 
49.36%; Evros: Male 52.2%, Female 47.79%). Concerning income level, although there 
are no available data for the specific research areas, the income level of the sample is 
close to the national average income per household (€23,394.73) (Hellenic Statistical 
Authority, 2010). Regarding educational level, an increase is presented in the higher 
education category compared to available data from 2001 on the total population. This 
difference was expected, as the educational level in Greece has significantly increased in 
the past decade (OECD, 2010). Furthermore, the higher educational level presented in the 
ALA Delta sample can be attributed to the proximity of the area to Thessaloniki and the 
better opportunities for higher education studies for the local population. Finally, the 
average age of respondents was 42 years. By comparing age categories with those of the 
total population in the two research areas (Hellenic Statistical Authority, 2001) revealed 
no important differences. However, a higher average age was presented in the Axios 
delta. 
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Table 1: Sample characteristics 
 Category Total 
sample 
Evros 
Delta 
ALA 
Delta 
Comparison of 
samples 
Male 49.7 50.4 49.6 Gender 
Female 50.3 49.6 51.0 
 
Fisher’s exact 
test=0.094, P>0.05 
Illiterate 3.8 2.1 5.4 
elementary 13.9 10.5 17.1 
High School 19.8 24.8 15.2 
Secondary (full) 28.9 39.1 19.5 
Post-Secondary 9.7 6.7 12.5 
HEI 21.2 14.3 27.6 
Education 
Master/PhD 2.6 2.5 2.7 
 
X2=44.291, P<0.01 
No income 10.8 10 11.6 
Up to 12,000 40.0 36.8 43.0 
12,000-30,000 44.8 48.5 41.4 
30,000-60,000 4.0 4.3 3.6 
Income 
Over 60,000 0.4 0.4 0.4 
 
χ2=2.97, P>0.05 
Age (mean) 41.65 38.57 44.35 t=4.81, P<0.05 
 
 
2.4 Data used in the analysis 
Table 2 presents the basic descriptive statistics of the variables used in our 
analysis. As we observe, a high level of zero responses was presented in all scenarios. 
Specifically, only 194 individuals stated an amount in the first scenario, 266 in the second 
and 229 in the third. We may see the WTP ranges €6.2 to €7.6 if we consider only the 
positive answers (WTP_Positive). However, we further analyze zero responses by 
identifying protest responses and including in the WTP measures true zeroes. This was 
conducted through the use of a debriefing question. Citizens who stated that they were 
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not willing to pay due their disbelief in the management of the PA from the proposed 
actor concerning both environmental and financial issues were regarded as protest 
responses (Jones et al., 2008). This further analysis in WTP answers caused significant 
changes in the WTP estimations. By excluding protest responses and including true 
zeroes we may see the WTP ranges from almost €4 to €5.2 (WTP_No_protest) (Table 2). 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the main variables  
Variable  Observations Mean Std. Dev. 
WTP1_Positive 194 7.601031 11.15071 
WTP1_No_Protest 335 4.401791 9.272146 
WTP2_Positive 266 7.485338 9.849998 
WTP2_No_Protest 384 5.185156 8.893164 
WTP3_Positive 229 6.148908 6.846767 
Dependent variables 
(WTP) 
WTP3_No_Protest 360 3.908611 6.210267 
General 
environmental interest 501 8.007984 2.108065 
Importance of 
protecting the NP 501 8.742515 1.936897 
Voluntary 
participation 501 .1616766 .3685219 
Awareness of regime 501 .4011976 .4906308 
Environmental 
concern and 
awareness 
Importance of the NP 
for the local 498 8.526104 7.481454 
Age 491 41.64969 15.50443 
Education 500 4.958 9.579968 
Gender 501 1.502994 .5004908 Demographic 
Income 486 3.623457 10.70062 
Constraint S1 500 3.16 6.795495 
Social Benefits S1 500 5.036 2.989411 
Environ. Benefits S1 498 6.114458 6.706925 
Constraint S2 500 3.772 5.373804 
Social Benefits S2 501 5.401198 2.94291 
Environ. Benefits S2 501 5.928144 3.038228 
Constraint S3 501 3.467066 3.223882 
Social Benefits S3 501 5.824351 7.837926 
Perceptions on 
scenarios 
Environ. Benefits S3 501 6.139721 6.686437 
Social Norms 493 -2.03e-07 1 
Institutional Trust 493 1.01e-07 .9999997 
Social Trust 493 2.86e-07 .9999999 
Social capital 
(aggregate indicators 
from EFA) Social Networks 493 -1.23e-07 .9999998 
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Furthermore, in order to minimize the amount of independent variables utilized in the 
WTP models, an Exploratory Factor Analysis was conducted in order to extract aggregate 
indicators of the four social capital indicators (KMO Measure of Sampling Adequacy: 
0.729). Specifically, four new factors were created representing SOCIAL NORMS 
(Cronbach a= 0.792), INSTITUTIONAL TRUST (Cronbach a=0.807), SOCIAL TRUST 
(Cronbach a= 0.722) and SOCIAL NETWORKS (Cronbach a=0.597) combining the 
relevant social capital variables in each factor. 
  
2.5 The proposed econometric models 
The usual approach to cope with cases of data with many zeros is the Tobit model 
formulated by Tobin (1958). We apply the Tobit model as 
   *Y X       ε ~ Ν(0,σ2)   (1) 
Tobit is used in order to avoid endogeneity bias 
 * ** 0 sinY if Yif Y mis gY     (2) 
where Y is an unobserved continuous dependent variable.   
 The method used is full information maximum likelihood (FIML) permitting for 
the correlation in the normally distributed error terms with the exogeneity test to present a 
test of ρ=0. Variables in the vector X2i are the identifying variables and are not in the X1i 
vector. They are expected to have high explanatory power in the instrumenting equation 
and to be uncorrelated (or with low correlation) with WTP as well as the disturbance term 
(Awad and Hollander 2010). 
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 The marginal effect of a variable like X1 on the expected value of WTP is 
calculated as   
1
( )( ) ( )E WTPE WTP ZX 
      (3) 
where Z is calculated at the mean values of all variables.  
   This model uses a censored dependent variable without examining the sources of 
zero responses and thus ignoring the zero responses due to non-participation decisions. 
Heckman (1979) suggested a model to tackle the problem with zero responses coming 
from non-participation of the respondents, claiming that censored estimation with 
selected sub-samples leads to sample selection bias. Instead, Heckman proposes a two-
stage estimation procedure.  
In the first stage, the probability of a positive outcome occurring is estimated with 
a Probit estimation in the full sample (selection or participation equation). We start our 
econometric formulation by using dichotomous choice variables. The probit model 
identifies the conditional probability as 
( ) ( )XP X Z dZ         (4) 
Where 
2
21( ) 2
Z
e 
      is the cumulative density function of the standard normal 
distribution and Φ(Z) is the standard normal distribution. The probit MLE first order 
conditions (FOCs) are 
1
( ) /[ ( )(1 ( ))]
N
i i i
i
X X X   

       (5) 
With the weight wi to vary across observations (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). The 
marginal effects in the probit formulation are given as  
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( ) ( )i ii j j
ij
P PXX     
        (6) 
This is followed by a censored estimation on the selected sub-sample of 
participation conditioned on observed positive values (conditional estimation). The 
Heckman also known as heckit model can be considered as a generalization of the Tobit 
model as it allows the independent variables to be part of both estimation stages.  
 If we consider two latent variables *iY  and *id  as functions of observable 
explanatory variables Xi  and Zi  the Heckman model then becomes 
* '
1i i id z    
With   1 2 21, ~ 0,i i N 
 
   
         (7) 
* '
2i i iY x     
Where the disturbance terms are independently and jointly normally distributed with 
covariance  . Then we have two equations in the form 
1 00 ii f di o th e r w is ed       (8) 
 * 1i iY if di o th erw iseY    
Where the first shows if an observation is in the sample or not while the second 
determines the value of Yi. In terms of the Tobit setup Zi=Xi, δ=β, 1 2i i   and ρ=1. 
 Cragg (1971) modified the Tobit model to tackle the problem with too many zero 
responses proposing the “double hurdle” model. Specifically, Cragg suggests the 
estimation of two hurdles with the first referring to the participation decision and the 
second to the level of participation. Hurdle models can be presented as  
18 
 
    * * *2 2 10 00 i i iY iff Y and Yi otherwiseY      (9) 
Although the double hurdle and the heckit models are similar the latter allows the 
existence of zeros in the second hurdle.  In the heckit model WTP depends on a selection 
equation deciding if a positive WTP is recorded while in the double hurdle WTP is 
determined in the participation equation. 
As the Tobit model is nested in the double hurdle model formulation we can test 
the use of the double hurdle model against Tobit using a Likelihood Ratio (LR) test as 
(Humphreys, 2010) 
* * 22( )~DH TOBIT pLR LL LL                (10) 
Where p the degrees of freedom equal to the number of parameters restrictions in the 
Tobit formulation. In the same lines and as the Heckman model is a non-nested in the 
double hurdle, Vuong (1989) suggested a modified likelihood ratio test in cases on non-
nested maximum likelihood estimators as 
* *
* * * * 2
~ (0,1)1 1( ) [ ( )]
DH H
DH H DH H
LL LLVuong test n N
LL LL LL LLn n
                  
          (11) 
 
4. Results 
The probit model used the binary variable WTP(0,1) as dependent variable while 
the Tobit model and the Heckman model used as dependent variable the open-ended one 
with positive and true zero responses giving us a mean estimated WTP. 
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4.1  Dichotomous WTP 
Table 3 presents the results of the Probit model formulation. As can be observed 
the importance of the parks existence for the local community and the three of the four 
factors of social capital (social norms and institutional and social trust) are statistically 
significant in all levels of statistical significance. Regarding demographic variables, 
income, educational level and gender are also statistically significant explanatory 
variables. Finally, the variable concerning awareness of the current protection regime is 
statistically insignificant in the first scenario but it is significant in the other two scenarios 
for a level of 10%. In all cases we find negative effects of all variables but knowledge of 
protection regime.  
It is interesting to mention that the marginal effects differ even for the same 
variable between scenarios. Differences in magnitude appear in the cases of parks’ 
importance, institutional trust and gender. There is also difference in the knowledge of 
protection regime between scenario 1 and the other two scenarios. The marginal effect in 
the case of knowledge of protection regimes is 0.292 implying a 29.2% higher probability 
for a WTP participation. Similarly in the case of social norms the there is an almost 14% 
probability for reducing WTP participation. Similar conclusions can be extracted from 
the rest of the marginal effects. 
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Table 3: Probit results 
           WTP1 
                    Marginal  
Estimates      Effect 
          WTP2 
                    Marginal  
Estimates      Effect 
           WTP3 
                    Marginal  
Estimates      Effect 
Constant -4.0165 
[0.0000] 
 -4.88173 
[0.0000] 
 -2.8198 
[0.0000] 
 
Importance of 
resource 
existence 
-0.11512 
[0.0000] 
-0.3507 -0.04733 
[0.0000] 
-0.01888 -0.2994 
[0.0000] 
-0.10222 
Social Norms -0.45278 
[0.0000] 
-0.1392 -0.51554 
[0.0000] 
-0.20566 -0.5692 
[0.0000] 
-0.2016 
Institutional 
Trust 
-0.63715 
[0.0000] 
-0.19606 -0.4473 
[0.0000] 
-0.17844 -0.2676 
[0.0000] 
-0.09055 
Social trust -0.55325 
[0.0000] 
-0.1699 -0.6024 
[0.0000] 
-0.2403 -0.57296 
[0.0000] 
-0.21013 
Income -0.34194 
[0.0030] 
-0.10474 -0.34774 
[0.0040] 
-0.13872 -0.59461 
[0.0000] 
-0.1989 
Education -0.02458 
[0.0090] 
-0.00764 -0.01779 
[0.0070] 
-0.0071 -0.01736 
[0.0100] 
-0.00526 
Gender -0.85379 
[0.0000] 
-0.2619 -0.24891 
[0.0760] 
-0.09929 -0.4963 
[0.0000] 
-0.15013 
Knowledge of 
protection 
regime 
0.0944 
[0.505] 
0.29214 0.27337 
[0.0610] 
0.10872 0.26936 
[0.0570] 
0.1098 
N 473 476 476 
Wald 28  443.09 [0.0000] 
229.57 
[0.0000] 
1676.63 
[0.0000] 
  Log Likelihood -1069.8 -898.74 -953.95 
Obs. P 0.389 0.5336 0.4559 
Pred. P 0.297 0.456 0.3772 
 
 
4.2.Open-ended WTP 
Table 4 presents the results derived by the Tobit and the Heckman models 
formulation. In the tobit model the importance of protecting the area is significant (at 
10% significance level) in the case of scenario 3. Income is important in scenarios 1 (at 
all levels) and 3 (at 10%) while age is significant in all scenarios and gender in scenarios 
1 and 3. The marginal effect of protecting the area is 0.2344 and 0.1987 for scenarios 1 
and 3 respectively. This implies that a change from one interval class to the other will 
decrease WTP by 23.4% and 20% accordingly.  
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Similarly the marginal effects of income are -0.162 and -0.611 for scenarios 1 and 
3 respectively. This means that a change from one interval class to the other will reduce 
WTP by 0.162 and 0.611 respectively for scenarios 1 and 3 respectively. The marginal 
effect in the case of age and in the second scenario is 0.0014 showing that older 
respondents give a lower WTP and a lower priority and preference to pay for protecting 
the parks.  
Looking at the sample selection model we see that in the first hurdle (selection 
equation) the determinants of the true WTP are the social norms, the institutional and 
social trusts in all scenarios. Age is positively influential in scenarios 1 and 3 as well as 
education in scenarios 1 and 2. Gender is negatively affecting WTP in all scenarios. In 
the second hurdle (intensity equation) the statistically significant variables are the 
environmental interest, the importance of protecting the area, the knowledge of protection 
regime, the importance of the resource existence in all scenarios and the volunteer 
participation in protecting the area in the case of scenarios 1 and 3.   
Besides income seems to be influential in all cases and it is worth mentioning that 
in the case of scenario 1 the influence is positive. For scenario 1 the variables social and 
environmental benefits seem to be very influential as well as the social norms factor. At 
the same time the inverse Mills ratio variable is statistically significant in all scenarios 
showing that the selection model must be used in order to avoid inconsistencies. The 
estimates are quite high implying that the two hurdles lead to different coefficient 
estimates.   
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Table 4: Tobit and Heckman results 
 WTP1 WTP2 WTP3 
 Tobit I         Tobit  II 
               First    Second 
              Hurdle  Hurdle 
Tobit I         Tobit  II 
               First    Second 
              Hurdle  Hurdle  
Tobit I           Tobit  II 
               First         Second 
              Hurdle      Hurdle 
Constant                                    -7.107  
                                  [0.000] 
                               1.2945 
                               [0.673] 
                                -6.89733 
                                   [0.000] 
Environmental 
interest 
                                 -0.0982 
                                  [0.000] 
                              -0.8684 
                               [0.042] 
                                  0.21173 
                                   [0.000] 
Protection  
Importance  
0.656                        -0.3898 
[0.120]                      [0.000] 
                               0.6932 
                               [0.042] 
0.4989                       -0.4785 
[0.074]                       [0.000] 
Volunteer 
participation  
                                  3.6145 
                                  [0.000] 
              -0.4295 
              [0.042] 
                -0.0934        -0.0933 
                 [0.000]        [0.000]  
Protection 
regime 
                                   1.665 
                                  [0.000] 
                                3.55223
                                 [0.005] 
1.8475                          0.5921 
[0.086]                       [0.0000] 
Existence 
importance of 
resource   
                                 -0.0394 
                                  [0.000] 
              -0.0355 
              [0.001] 
                -0.00021 
                 [0.000] 
Social  
Norms 
-2.0723    -0.0271     -1.9295     
[0.019]     [0.000]      [0.024]     
-0.7266  -0.1661 
[0.256]   [0.035] 
                -0.0066 
                  [0.000] 
Institutional 
Trust 
                 0.00253 
                 [0.000] 
1.074      -0.3692 
[0.085]    [0.000] 
                -0.0876 
                 [0.000] 
Social 
Trust 
                 -0.1157 
                 [0.039] 
               -0.7415 
                [0.000] 
                -0.0734 
                 [0.000] 
Income -0.4522 -0.0269 0.00397 
[0.000]      [0.739]      [0.000] 
                -0.488     -1.2357     
                [0.178]    [0.000] 
-1.5341                    -0.49515 
[0.059]                        [0.000] 
Age -0.0039     0.00026 
[0.083]     [0.000] 
-0.0016   -0.00414 
[0.000]    [0.369] 
-0.00244    .00047 
[0.077]       [0.000] 
Education                   0.00013 
                  [0.000] 
               -0.01678 
                [0.0190] 
 
Gender -2.83        -0.0861 
[0.082]      [0.000]      
                -0.43211 
                 [0.002] 
-2.1578     -0.15853 
[0.028]       [0.000] 
Social Benefits                                   0.6182 
                                  [0.000] 
  
Environmental 
Benefits 
                                 -0.6124 
                                  [0.000] 
  
Inverse Mills  
Ratio 
                        1.9317                             
                        [0.000] 
        1.088 
                      [0.000] 
                               10.858 
                               [0.000] 
n 
censored 
uncensored 
467 
284 
183 
466 
218 
248 
471 
257 
214 
  Log Likelihood -830.53               -928.78 -1071.24      -1754.89 -844.964            -975.35  
   LR (rho=0)                         159.54                
                        [0.000] 
                        3.84 
                        [0.000] 
                              125.45 
                              [0.000] 
 
Moving on to table 5 and the double hurdle extracted results we see that at the 
first hurdle (selection equation) the determinants of the true WTP are the institutional and 
social trust in all scenarios and the social norms in scenario 1.  The importance of 
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protection seems statistically significant in scenarios 1 and 3, while the knowledge of 
protection regime seems statistically significant in scenarios 2 and 3.  Education and 
gender seem very influential variables in all scenarios while Age is influential in scenario 
1. In the second hurdle (intensity of use equation) the significant variables are the 
importance of protecting the area in scenarios 1 and 2, the knowledge of protection 
regime in scenarios 2 and 3 while the importance of the resource existence is insignificant 
in all scenarios. Besides social trust is significant in all scenarios and social norms in 
scenarios 1 and 2. Age seems to be influential in scenario 1. 
 
Table 5: Double hurdle results  
 WTP1 WTP2 WTP3 
     First    Second 
    Hurdle  Hurdle 
       First    Second 
      Hurdle  Hurdle  
 First        Second      
Hurdle      Hurdle 
Constant 6.5418        -9.8626        
[0.017]        [0.000]  
  3.0999              3.5049 
  [0.097]             [0.020] 
-3.9911           2.9768 
[0.181]           [0.000]  
Protection  
Importance 
-0.2219        1.2503        
[0.004]        [0.000] 
-0.1072               0.1906 
  [0.192]             [0.099] 
0.6759         
[0.024]        
Protection regime   4.2748               -2.4997    
 [0.065]               [0.013] 
2.2589            -3.6602 
[0.036]            [0.000] 
Existence importance 
of resource   
 -0.06184           -0.02213 
 [0.313]               [0.081] 
                      -0.09754 
                        [0.000] 
Social  
Norms 
-0.6991        1.497          
[0.097]        [0.000]   
                           1.4892 
                           [0.099] 
 
Institutional 
Trust 
-0.5887 
[0.000] 
 1.5620 
 [0.002] 
 1.386 
[0.000] 
Social 
Trust 
-0.9254        -1.5198       
[0.000]         [0.062] 
-0.5238                 1.002               
[0.068]                [0.015] 
-1.0917            1.1246            
[0.014]            [0.000] 
Age -0.0005      -0.00175 
[0.059]        [0.035] 
  
Education -0.0869       
[0.384]          
-0.02107 
  [0.093] 
1.2301 
[0.000] 
Gender -2.944          0.1413 
[0.059]        [0.199]     
 -2.1291 
  [0.036] 
-2.4962          
[0.014]          
n 
censored 
uncensored 
482 
290 
192 
489 
228 
261 
489 
263 
226 
    Wald LR (rho=0) 0.02 
[0.8804] 
0.04 
[0.8475] 
0.03 
[0.8728] 
  Log Likelihood -934.693 -1144.75 -972.793 
Some variables were omitted from both hurdles due to lack of convergence.  
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Finally, Table 6 presents the likelihood ratio results for comparing the 
appropriateness of using double hurdle against Tobit and Heckman models. In all cases 
double hurdle model formulations are in favor. 
Table 6: Likelihood ratio tests 
Likelihood ratio 
DH vs Tobit 
Likelihood ratio 
DH vs Heckman 
208.326 -1710.4 
147.02 -3.4767 
255.658 4006.117 
 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
The present paper aimed to explore willingness to pay of local communities for the 
protection of two National Parks of Greece. Three different scenarios were presented to a 
sample of locals representing different payment vehicles. Through the study, social 
factors influencing the decision of individuals to contribute some amount were explored. 
Furthermore, the influence of these factors on the specific WTP amount was also 
investigated. Several interesting results came out from the analysis, which are discussed 
next. 
Regarding the intention to pay of individuals, the highest percentage of positive 
answers was presented for the market based scenario, introducing the entrance fee as a 
payment vehicle. The lowest level of intention to pay was presented for the first scenario 
where the payment vehicle was a state tax. The high level of refusals presented in the 
study has also been observed in previous national studies (Menegaki et al., 2007; Polyzou 
et al., 2011; Jones et al., 2009). Regarding the specific amount stated by respondents, the 
highest WTP was declared for the market-based scenario (€5.18) and the lowest for the 
state tax (€4.40). By comparing citizens’ responses in the three scenarios, the low level of 
intention and willingness to pay in the regulatory scenario is possibly connected with the 
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low level of trust towards state institutions. Citizens are reluctant to pay taxes to the state 
due to their belief that these will not be managed in an efficient manner (Jones et al., 
2011). The fact that the market-based instrument is perceived in a more positive way is 
possibly due to the fact that the economic burden for environmental conservation is been 
distributed both to visitors and the local community and also that the specific scenario 
promotes the participation of non-state actors in the management procedures. 
According to the results of the Probit analysis, conducted for each scenario, most 
social capital variables are connected with the decision of individuals to state an amount 
in all scenarios. These refer to social norms, social trust and institutional trust. It is 
interesting to note that there is a negative influence of social capital variables which 
comes in contrast with recent findings (Polyzou et al., 2011; Jones et al., 2011). This 
means that citizens who tend not to trust their fellow citizens and institutions of their 
community and also tend to regard that it is justifiable not to comply with social norms 
are more positive in stating a specific amount. A possible explanation is that people with 
lower levels of trust in institutions and their fellow citizens regard that only through their 
personal contribution it is possible to resolve environmental issues in their area. 
Furthermore, income, education and gender also influence the decision of individuals to 
contribute some amount. Specifically, citizens who intend to give some amount are of 
lower income and educational level. This result can be explained taking into 
consideration the social characteristics of the specific local communities. Citizens who 
are more concerned for the protection of the park are those who are involved in 
agricultural activities and thus are included in lower educational and income level social 
group.  
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Regarding factors explaining the specific amount stated by individuals for the 
protection of the national park, a diverse influence is presented depending on the scenario 
analyzed. From the social capital variables, social norms have a positive influence for the 
regulatory and the market based scenario. This means that citizens who regard that it is 
unjustifiable to disobey social norms are willing to pay a higher amount. This finding is 
in accordance with the relevant literature (Pretty, 2003; Jones et al., 2011) and can be 
explained taking into consideration the fact that the specific scenarios have a higher 
‘need’ for citizens’ compliance with regulations in order to be effective (Jones et al., 
2009). Concerning social trust, a positive impact was presented for the WTP of the 
market based and the participatory scenario. This result confirms previous findings (Jones 
et al., 2011) underlining that citizens who tend to trust their fellow citizens develop a 
stronger belief that their community will act in favor of the collective benefit (Pretty, 
2003) and incidents of free-riding will remain to a minimum (Jones et al., 2011).  
However, an opposite influence of social trust is presented in the first scenario where 
citizens with higher levels of trust are willing to pay a lower amount. A possible 
explanation for this result is that there is an influence from ‘negative’ social capital 
(Adler & Kwon, 1999). This implies that further research should be conducted in order to 
interpret this result. Concerning the influence of citizens’ perceptions and awareness, the 
importance of protecting the area is positively connected both with the regulatory and the 
market based scenario. Thus, citizens with higher environmental concerns for the area are 
more willing to pay for its protection. It is also interesting to note that citizens who are 
not informed on the current protection regime are more willing to pay in the context of 
the market based and the participatory scenario. Thus, unawareness is connected with a 
27 
 
higher tendency to support alternative management scenarios, such as the second and 
third proposed scenario of the study. Finally, concerning the impact of demographic 
factors, it is interesting to observe that income does not influence the specific amount 
stated by individuals. 
In conclusion, an important finding of the study concerns the higher WTP of 
individuals towards the market based scenario where participation of citizens is 
promoted. This result is in accordance with the general tendency in current environmental 
policy, where there is a need to shift in less regulatory instruments and increase citizens’ 
participation in decision-making and management processes (Bogaert et al., 2009; Clark 
and Clarke 2011; Gerhardinger et al., 2009; Moreno-Sanchez and Maldonado, 2010). A 
second important finding of the study concerns the impact of social capital parameters. A 
general conclusion is that social capital variables, especially social norms and social trust, 
have a strong influence both on the decision of individuals to pay and the specific amount 
stated. However, this influence is differentiated depending on the scenario presented. 
Some explanations have been presented in the analysis for this finding, however, further 
research is necessary in order to better understand the diverse influence of these social 
factors. 
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